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ABSTRACT Private security companies (PSCs) currently receive a great deal of
attention in the news media, in sensationalist reporting, and increasingly in
scholarly books and articles. While the scholarly books and articles make
significant contributions to our understanding of this global phenomenon, there
are several impediments to analysis that must be recognized and overcome if
analysis is to be improved. Three of these impediments are reviewed in this
article. The author suggests that US government material is currently available to
minimize impediments and offers a framework to make analytical sense of it.
Since contracting out is based on contracts, and unless the complexities of
awarding and managing contracts are understood, recommendations made to
reform the process of contracting out security are unrealistic.
KEY WORDS: Civil–Military Relations, Contracting Out, Inherently Govern-
mental Function, Private Security Company, Private Military Company
Even before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there was an increasing
but mixed literature on private security companies (PSCs, also called
private military companies, or PMCs) with a focus on individual firms
as case studies in such countries as Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone,
Angola, and the like.1 With the wars in the Balkans, and the greatly
increased use of PSCs, and with the much heralded Military
Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) in the lead for its work
in training the nascent Croat Armed Forces, there was even more
attention. Then, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and egregious
1On the background see David Shearer, Private Armies and Military Intervention
(New York: OUP 1998).
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violence and human rights abuses, with attention-demanding PSCs
such as CACI, Titan, and of course Blackwater USA, there has been not
only a gigantic increase in the number of contractors, as displayed in
Table 1, but also an increase in the efforts to analyze and to understand
the phenomenon.2
While the periodic reporting in leading daily media sources such as
the New York Times and Washington Post, monthly periodicals such as
The Atlantic Monthly and Harpers, and National Public Radio (NPR)
and Public Broadcasting Services (PBS) continue to focus attention on
the phenomenon, and the sensationalist articles and books stimulate yet
more attention, the scholarly books provide a great amount of data and
insights.3 Each of the scholars researching and writing on this topic has,
however, taken a different approach to the analysis. There is currently
no agreed upon framework, and there are several impediments to
analysis that must be identified and overcome.4 The impediments are –
first, the problem of perspectives that results in polemics and minimizes
the likelihood that the PSC ‘industry’ will take seriously the criticisms
of the scholars or that the scholars will appreciate the legal and
institutional context within which the industry operates; second, the
mixed and diverse set of ‘drivers’ leading to increased reliance on PSCs
which, taken together, make the understanding of the complex
phenomenon very challenging; and third, the problems of methodology
and data as the former has been very limited and proprietary, thus
impeding a robust methodology.
The awareness of these three challenges limiting the analysis in
earlier publications on the PSCs has led me to rely on data from United
States Government sources, which only became available when the
party that was not involved so directly in the decisions to go to war,
the Democrats, took office in 2007 with both houses of Congress and
then in 2009 with the executive. These data, however, in their raw
state are difficult to draw conclusions from, and thus this article offers
2Congressional Budget Office, Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq
(Washington DC: CBO Aug. 2008), 13.
3I have in mind here the following scholarly books, by recognized academics, and
published by academic presses. See bibliography for full citations. Avant (2005),
Chesterman and Lehnardt (2007), Chesterman and Fisher (2009), Dunigan (2011),
Sheehy et al. (2009), Singer (2003), and Stanger (2009). This is not a definitive list, but
is rather suggestive of the type of serious research and analysis that can be found on this
topic. An industry view can be found in Patrick Cullen and Peter Ezra Weinberger, POI
Report: Reframing the Defense Outsourcing Debate: Merging Government Oversight
with Industry Partnership (Washington DC: Peace Operations Institute 2007).
4Three of these approaches, those of Peter Singer, Deborah Avant and Christopher
Kinsey, are reviewed in Molly Dunigan, Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’
Impact on Military Effectiveness (Stanford: Stanford UP 2011), 12–14.



























a framework used in work on civil-military relations. From the analysis
utilizing this data and the framework four major problems to be
resolved are highlighted. The academic authors noted above also
highlight problems, and all but two of them make recommendations for
improvements. This author found in his research, especially in
conducting interviews with contractors, their lawyers, and lobbyists,
that there is in fact a high degree of overlap between the views of the
academic analysts and the contractors. For example, they all agree that
the main issue or challenge is ultimately the ability of the US
Government to remedy the more prominent liabilities involved in





Conflict Contractora Military Personnela
Revolutionary War 2 9 1 to 6
War of 1812 n.a. 38 n.a.
Mexican-American War 6 33 1 to 6
Civil War 200 1,000 1 to 5
Spanish-American War n.a. 35 n.a.
World War I 85 2,000 1 to 24
World War II 734 5,400 1 to 7
Korea 156 393 1 to 2.5
Vietnam 70 359 1 to 5
Gulf War 9b 500 1 to 55b
Balkans 20 20 1 to 1
Iraq Theater as of early 2008c 190 200 1 to 1
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from William W. Epley, ‘Civilian Support of
Field Armies’ Army Logistician, 22 (Nov./Dec. 1990), 30–5; Steven J. Zamparelli, ‘Contractors on
the Battlefield: What Have we Signed up for?’ Air Force Journal of Logistics 23/3 (Fall 1999), 10–
19; Department of Defense, Report on DoD Program for Planning, Managing, and Accounting for
Contractor Services and Contractor Personnel During Contingency Operations (Oct. 2007), 12.
Note: n.a. ¼ not available.
a. For some conflicts, the estimated number of contractor personnel includes civilians employed
by the US government. However, because most civilians present during military operations are
contractor personnel, the inclusion of government civilians should not significantly affect the
calculated ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel.
b. The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services during
Operations ‘Desert Shield’ and ‘Desert Storm’.
Personnel associated with those provisions are not included in the data or the ratio.
c. For this study, the Congressional Budget Office considers the following countries to be part of
the Iraq theater: Iraq, Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the
United Arab Emirates.



























utilizing PSCs.5 It is concluded that with sufficient political will three
of the major problems could be resolved; the one centered on the
awarding and oversight of contracts is unlikely to be resolved short of a
major change in the way the US Government operates. This author,
then, is not sanguine on the likelihood of reform.
The Problem with Polemics
The analysis of contracting out security, which is what the PSCs
epitomize, is complicated by the polemics involved. It must be noted
early on that the focus here is on PSCs and not contracting out in
general. Whereas in late 2010 there were 176,000 Department of
Defense (DoD) contractors in the CENTCOM area of responsibility
(vs. 209,000 uniformed personnel) the figures for PSCs were 18,919
in Afghanistan and 8,327 in Iraq.6 I have found minimal cross-
fertilization between those involved in the ‘industry’ and the scholars
who write analytically about it. Clearly, the industry engages in
lobbying and strategic communication, with trade conferences and
meetings, but there are slight efforts by its proponents to contribute to
the scholarly literature. This domain is largely monopolized by
academics that write books and articles, and they begin with the
assumption of the sovereign state, which in Western history originates
with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. Max Weber probably best
posited that a state requires a monopoly on the use of force: ‘The claim
of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as
its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation.’7
This notion of the centrality of coercive power, a monopoly on the use
5Of the seven books listed in note 3, Avant and Chesterman and Fisher do not offer
recommendations although they, as all of the authors, identify serious problems in the
use of PSCs. On the other hand, a non-academic, T.X. Hammes, ‘Private Contractors in
Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact’, Joint Forces Quarterly
60 (2011), 26–37, uses four of his eleven pages for recommendations. Basically the
same article, ‘Reassessing the Use of Contractors in Combat Zones,’ is also published in
Armed Forces Journal (June 2011), 10–14, 35–37.
6Moshe Schwartz, ‘The Department of Defense’s Use of Private Security Contractors
in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress’,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (21 Feb. 2011). Note that these
are only DoD numbers. SIGIR [Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction]
includes data beyond DoD, and reports that, as of mid-2010 the figures are 20,738
PSCs to 75,000 US troops. See SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States
Congress, 30 July 2010, 58.
7Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by
Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press 1978), 56.



























of force that is normally exercised by the military in the modern state, is
a central theme of contemporary political sociology. Integral to this
since the professionalization of armed forces in Prussia in the
nineteenth century, a trend that spread globally during the twentieth
century, was the general assumption that a state’s monopoly of force is
exercised through professional militaries; later, this came to include
professional, state-controlled intelligence and police organizations. In
this conceptualization, where the state is assumed to hold a monopoly
on the use of violence, exercised through a professional military, the
privatization of armed force is an anomaly, something that should not
happen, and if it does, must be explained.
From a Political Theory perspective, the influence of which is also
found in some of the scholarly literature, the obligatory quote is from
Niccolo Machiavelli, writing in 1513, who had this to say about
mercenaries: ‘Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous.
Any man who founds his state on mercenaries can never be safe or
secure, because they are disunited, ambitious, undisciplined, and
untrustworthy – bold fellows among their friends but cowardly in the
face of the enemy; they have no fear of God, nor loyalty to men.’8 The
perception that there is something abnormal, illegal, shady, and just not
right about the privatization of security and defense continues to
influence authors 500 years later.
Reinforcing these concepts about the dangers of privatizing security
are two perceptions that came directly from the occupation of Iraq
following the US-led invasion in 2003. The first is that private guards
engaged in torture and murder, which arose from the torture of
prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison, in which contractors from CACI
International Inc. and Titan Corporation were involved, and the
infamous Sept. 2007 case in which Blackwater USA personnel are
accused of killing 17 innocent Iraqi civilians in Nisoor Square,
Baghdad. For many authors – and probably many Americans – these
have become the defining characteristics of PSCs. The second
assumption is more tempered, but it assumes that even if the
contracting firms are effective in fulfilling the terms of their specific
contracts, such as Blackwater personnel protecting the Department of
State ‘principals’ in Nisoor Square, by their actions they set back the
8Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, translated and edited by Robert M. Adams (New
York: Norton 1977 [Originally written in 1513]), 35. While most scholarly books
avoid the use of the term ‘mercenary’ which is common with the more sensationalist
books, at least one does. See Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From
Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (New
York: OUP 2007).



























overall war effort and America’s prestige in the world by employing
mercenaries who appear to be out of control.9
In stark contrast to this negative image, the contractors themselves,
their lobbyists and strategic communicators, and those in government
who employ them note that contracting-out is legal, indeed is strongly
encouraged by US law and government policy. The contractors are
acting in accordance with what they have been contracted to do. The
legal basis for contracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
has no prohibition against a firm making a profit. In fact, the whole
premise for replacing government employees with private contractors
rests on the assumption that competition for making a profit in an
open marketplace guarantees the best quality product or service for
the least cost. An increasing number of federal policy documents,
including the Quadrennial Defense Review, of 2006 include contrac-
tors as an integral element in US national security and defense
policy.10
Contracting out became a major theme during the Ronald Reagan
administration, and continued on during the Clinton administration
where it was used mainly in the Department of Defense, and was
promoted by then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics, Jacques Gansler. It became almost a
theology during the George W. Bush administrations. A 2008
Congressional Research Service report gives an authoritative and
succinct introduction to what is involved, and hints as to the extensive
legal basis, for government privatization:
Sometimes called contracting out, ‘outsourcing’ refers to an
agency engaging a private firm to perform an agency function or
provide a service . . . . Federal outsourcing policy is governed by
the FAR and the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act
of 1998 (P.L. 105-270). FAIR requires agencies to produce
inventories of ‘commercial activities’ – those that are not
‘inherently governmental’ and able to be acquired from the
private sector – that may be put up for competitive sourcing.
9See for example P.W. Singer, ‘Can’t Win with ‘em, Can’t Go to War without ‘em:
Private Military Contractors and Counterinsurgency’, Policy Paper Number 4,
Washington DC: Brookings Institution, Sept. 2007.
10The Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 defines the US ‘Total Force’ as
consisting of an ‘Active Component, Reserve Component, civilians and contractors’,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 Feb. 2006,
75, 5www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf4.



























OMB’s Circular A-76 provides agencies with specific directions
for undertaking competitive sourcing.11
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76, updated in
2003, provides the legal basis for outsourcing, and there is an extensive
literature on this topic which conveys a sense of the extremely pro-
privatization orientation of the US government, under both Republican
and Democratic administrations. Thus, while social scientists, some
journalists, and sectors of the general public see contracting out
functions in national security and defense as anomalous, even somehow
shady, large sectors of government have come to view it as standard
operating procedure. The large conceptual or intellectual gap between
contractors and their employers in government, and outside observers
who are not familiar with or empathize with the legality of the
‘industry’, does not assist in developing some degree of common
reference that could result in a mutual understanding or a common
approach to the phenomenon.
The Drivers of the Contracting Out Phenomenon
It is important to emphasize that there is a diverse set of ‘drivers’ to
contracting out; this is not a simple and straightforward phenomenon
with one or two easy to understand causes and explanations, and thus
clear and obvious remedies. Rather, the causes behind the phenomenon
are several and diverse and this makes for a major difficulty in
understanding the phenomenon, and vastly increases the challenge of
finding practical remedies. Some of the most important are the
following:
First, a most authoritative source to establish a baseline description
of the general context for contacting out is the testimony of David M.
Walker, at that time US Comptroller General, to the US House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Readiness in March 2008. Walker
gives a list of the factors that have led federal agencies to outsource
services:
. . . limitations on the number of authorized full-time equivalent
positions; unavailability of certain capabilities and expertise
among federal employees; desire for operational flexibility; and
the need for ‘surge’ capacity. According to DoD [Department of
Defense] and armed service officials, several factors have
contributed to the department’s increased use of contractors for
11Kevin R. Kosar, ‘Privatization and the Federal Government: An Introduction’, CRS
Report for Congress 26 Dec. 2008, 15.



























support services: (1) the increased requirements associated with
the Global War on Terrorism and other contingencies; (2) policy
to rely on the private sector for needed commercial services that
are not inherently governmental in nature; and (3) DoD initiatives,
such as competitive sourcing and utility privatization programs.12
All of these are ongoing and long-term motivations. In addition we can
cite the following:
With the all-volunteer force, private security contractors are deemed
necessary. At the end of the Cold War, the US Army went from
732,000 active personnel in 1990 to 490,000 in 1997; for the three
services, including the Marines, the numbers were 2,043,705 in 1990,
to 1,438,562 in 1997. As of August 2009, with two wars going on,
the size of the US Army stood at 552,425. A number of contractor
proponents highlighted to me the personnel shortage to explain the
growth of the PSCs.13
Specifically with regard to the growth in PSCs, the military cannot
provide security protection to personnel who are not members of DoD:
‘. . . the military provides security to contractors and government
civilians only if they deploy with the combat force or directly support
the military’s mission . . . . As a result, the use of contactors to provide
security has increased – a well-publicized and controversial aspect of
contractor support in Iraq.’14 The Department of State (DoS), USAID
(US Agency for International Development), and others thus have no
option but to contract out to meet their security needs in countries
whose entire territory is a conflict zone. Ignoring the need for reliable
protection was not an option. The DoS, however, has neither an
acquisition corps, which the military has long had, nor a tradition of
providing oversight or control over these kinds of private entities.
12David M. Walker, comptroller general of the United States, ‘DoD Needs to
Reexamine its Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Manage-
ment and Oversight’, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on
Armed Services, US House of Representatives, 110th Congress, second session, 11
March 2008, GAO-08-572T: 4–5.
13The data for 1990 are from ‘Selected Manpower Statistics Fiscal Year 1990’, AD-
A235 849, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations
and Reports, Department of Defense. Data for 1997 and 2009 are available at5http://
siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/tab94.
14CBO, Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq, 13. It should also be noted that
DoD was the lead agency for postwar Iraq in accord with President George W. Bush
signing National Security Presidential Directive 24, on 20 January 2003. See Nora
Bensahel, ‘Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction’,
Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006), 458.



























Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2001–06) wanted to
demonstrate that the Iraq invasion and pacification could be
accomplished with a lean fighting force, and that technology would
be a sufficient force multiplier. A success in Iraq would legitimate his
policies that promoted defense ‘transformation’ over a traditional
build-up of forces. As Richard N. Haass points out in his book, the
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a ‘war of choice’ rather than of necessity
as its proponents claimed.15 Whereas the United States deployed
500,000 troops in the 1991 war against Iraq, in line with the Powell
Doctrine of using overwhelming force to achieve a clear goal, the 2003
invasion kept troop levels to about 150,000. General Eric Shinseki,
Army chief of staff, expressed his disagreement with this policy while
being questioned before Congress in 2003. Shortly thereafter, Secretary
of Defense Rumsfeld announced Shinseki’s replacement, about 18
months before his scheduled retirement. Rumsfeld ignored military
advice on the resources needed to win the war, and other military
leaders did not push back.16
There are, then, several dimensions to the rapid growth in
contracting in services in general, and security in particular. Secretary
Rumsfeld’s successor, Robert M. Gates, later stated, the numbers and
the use of contractors in Iraq, whose numbers ‘grew willy-nilly after
2003’, require study.17 The study is complicated by the many and
diverse motivations for contracting out that are listed above.
The combination of the extensive legal basis, and indeed incentives
for contracting out, combined with the diverse drivers for the
phenomenon, has resulted in a very big industry, and one that, not
surprisingly, would like to continue. The very authoritative Defense
Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services Contracting
notes the following: ‘DoD services contracting in 2010 added up to
15See Richard N. Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars
(New York: Simon & Schuster 2009).
16Richard Haass refers to ‘. . . the effective silencing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’. This relates to the administration’s unrealistic
assessment of what could be achieved in Iraq. Haass, War of Necessity War of Choice,
18–19. See also Bensahel, ‘Mission Not Accomplished’ and Nora Bensahel et al., After
Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Arroyo Center 2008). Joseph Collins lists ten ‘Errors in Decisionmaking and
Execution’, of which eight concern lack of manpower. See Joseph J. Collins, ‘Choosing
War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath’, Occasional Paper, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008, 16.
17Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Challenges
Facing the Department of Defense, US Senate Committee on Armed Services, 111th
Congress, 2nd session, 27 January 2009, 8.



























more than $200 billion – over 50 percent of the total DoD acquisition
budget.’18 If we look specifically at PSCs, which is the focus of this
article and all of the scholarly books listed in the bibliography, it is a
more manageable universe, but a very complicated one by their need to
carry weapons. Due to implications arising from being armed, the PSCs
have also drawn a great deal of attention from the US Congress.
The Scale of Contracting in National Security and Defense: Issues of
Methodology and Data
Table 1 above, the CBO report, Contractors’ Support of US Operations
in Iraq which ‘examines the use of contractors in the Iraq theater from
2003 through 2007’ demonstrates that there are a large number of
contractors. Some of the key points in the text accompanying the table
are as follows:
. ‘From 2003 through 2007, US agencies awarded $85 billion in
contracts for work to be principally performed in the Iraq theater,
accounting for almost 20 percent of funding for operations in Iraq.’
. ‘The Department of Defense (DoD) awarded contracts totaling $76
billion, of which the Army (including the Joint Contracting
Command – Iraq/Afghanistan) obligated 75 percent. The US Agency
for International Development and the Department of State
obligated roughly $5 billion and $4 billion, respectively, over the
same period.’
. ‘Although personnel counts are rough approximations, CBO
estimates that as of early 2008 at least 190,000 contractor
personnel, including subcontractors, were working on US-funded
contracts in the Iraq theater.’
. ‘The United States has used contractors during previous military
operations, although not to the current extent. According to rough
historical data, the ratio of about one contactor employee for every
member of the US armed forces in the Iraq theater is at least 2.5
times higher than that ratio during any other major US conflict,
although it is roughly comparable with the ratio during operations
in the Balkans in the 1990s.’19
18Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services
Contracting, Washington DC, March 2011, iii.
19‘Introduction and Summary’, 1. All of the above quotes are from this page. This
report refers to a total of $446 billion for contracting in Iraq, but this total is an
underestimate, as it does not include contract costs in countries outside the Iraq theater.



























The CBO report makes clear that in the current conflict, ‘Contractors
also perform some functions, such as security, that traditionally have
been reserved for the military’.20 This is a crucial point: private
contractors are filling missions that were traditionally the monopoly of
the state. The report continues, ‘. . . total spending by the US
government and other contractors for security provided by contractors
in Iraq from 2003 through 2007 was between $6 billion and $10
billion. As of early 2008, approximately 25,000 to 30,000 employees
of private security contractors were operating in Iraq.’21 To be clear,
this sum is for security alone, whereas the $85 billion total mentioned
in the full report is for contracting in general.
According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR), following the direction of Congress to compile data on and
analyze PSCs specifically, as of October 2008, it had identified 77
individual companies that had provided security services to US
agencies working in Iraq since 2003. In the May 2009 update of the
report, SIGIR identified another 16, bringing the total to 93 companies
that provided physical security services in Iraq. The report estimates
that since the war’s inception in 2003, DoD, DoS, and USAID have
spent $5.9 billion on contracts and subcontracts for PSCs. In
interviews at SIGIR in February and June 2009, officials emphasized
that the PSCs are crucial in the overall reconstruction effort, and could
become even more important as US forces withdraw, first from the
major cities and ultimately from the country.22 Drawing from the
CBO report cited above, they noted that actual expenditures are
probably double the $5.9 billion that they have so far traced in their
ongoing audits; in some service contracts, security is up to half of the
total costs.
Neither CBO nor SIGIR claim to have developed a precise definition
of just what is a PSC, but the working definition includes firms doing
the following four functions:
. Static security: protect fixed or static sites, such as housing areas,
reconstruction work sites, or government buildings;
. Convoy security: protect convoys traveling in Iraq;
. Security escorts: protect individuals traveling in unsecured areas in
Iraq; and,
20CBO, Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq, 12.
21Ibid.
22Author interviews at SIGIR with the Deputy Director, the Assistant Inspector General
for Audits, and several auditors, Arlington, Virginia, 26 February and 16 June 2009. In
the latter interview I met with the three senior auditors working on the PSCs, including
David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audits.



























. Personal security details: provide protective security to high-ranking
individuals.
These four functions require that the contractors be armed. This
means they can either respond to hostilities, or, if they perceive an
imminent threat, preempt it by initiating the use of force. The missions
taken on by PSCs are largely those that military service members
themselves previously provided.
Obstacles posed by Data and Methodology
It should be obvious that the numbers cited above are variable; even the
official investigatory bodies do not agree on numbers. There are several
challenges regarding the collection of data on and methodologies for
studying PSCs. Peter Singer and Christopher Kinsey highlight some of
these basic difficulties.23 These, and the several I cite below, seriously
complicate the analysis by scholars since they challenge knowledge of
the universe and any idea about the representativeness of the sample of
PSCs reviewed.
First, as private providers, security contractors are exempt from the
transparency required of government agencies, even if the over-
whelming majority of the money the contractors receive comes from
these agencies. Their information and documents are considered
proprietary and, unlike government agencies and the US military, the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not apply to them.24 As they
respond to request for proposals (RFPs) their responses are confidential
since they are competing with other firms to ‘capture’ the contracts.
Second, they are profit-making businesses that to succeed must be
entrepreneurial. This means that the contractors expand and contract
in response to supply and demand, move in and out of different areas of
activity where and when they see opportunities for making a profit, and
23P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2003), ix–x. On 79, Singer discusses the difficulty of even
knowing about the universe of private military contractors. The methodology challenge
is also raised by Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The
Rise of Private Military Companies (London and New York: Routledge 2006), 1–2.
24In my interview with members of the permanent staff of the Committee on Oversight
and Government Reform of the US House of Representatives in Washington on 7
January 2009, they emphasized how difficult it is to obtain information from the PSCs,
even though the committee has subpoena power and can conduct depositions. The lack
of transparency is an important element in the excellent analysis by Deborah Avant and
Lee Siegelman, on the impact of PSCs on American democracy. See Avant and
Sigelman, ‘Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in Iraq’, Security
Studies 19/2 (April–June 2010), 230–65, especially 262.



























are sold and acquired depending on market forces.25 There are
hundreds, maybe thousands of PSCs, and there is no agency responsible
for keeping track of them.
Third, each contractor offers different product lines or services,
which are diverse, and firms to be successful must be extremely
dynamic. A single contractor may well have programs in the United
States, Kosovo, Liberia, and Colombia, making it impossible to be sure
that any sample of programs is representative of a larger set, or to come
to general conclusions about the whole.
Fourth, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq triggered an explosion of
contracting, measured both in amounts of money and numbers of
personnel. Any phenomenon that is so dynamic is extremely difficult to
track, even if there were adequate legal bases and qualified personnel to
track them. For all of these reasons, even though the PSCs are engaged
in many of the same missions as the US military, there is little visibility
into their operations, including for scholarly analysis.
Finally, private security contractors tend to be highly secretive, and
for a number of reasons. These firms are concerned with security in
frequently violent situations of expeditionary or contingency environ-
ments, which demand a high degree of operational secrecy. Most
personnel are former police or military, for whom secrecy is part of
their standard mode of operation. These firms operate in a wide-open
marketplace, with ever-increasing numbers of competitors and virtually
no regulation, so secrecy is seen as a necessary aspect of protecting their
market share.
These impediments to gathering reliable data have clear implications
for methodology, in that the universe is unclear and thus the sampling
cannot be representative. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, the field
today is heavily a US phenomenon. Fairly recently a wealth of
government documents has become available since SIGIR was founded
in late 2003 and the Democratic Party took control of Congress in early
2007, where they remained in control until the November 2010
elections. Legislators mandated the conduct and release of a consider-
able stream of audits and studies by SIGIR, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The GAO has
25For example, two of the largest contracting firms, MPRI and DynCorp, were
acquired by other, even larger firms. In June 2000, MPRI was acquired by L-3
Communications; DynCorp was acquired by Computer Sciences Corporation in 2003
and ‘now has nearly 14,000 employees in 30 countries’. Jennifer K. Elsea et al., ‘Private
Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’, CRS Report
for Congress, updated 29 Sept. 2008, 8.



























also been tasked to investigate the shortcomings in DoD’s management
and training of contractor support to deployed forces since 1997.27
This overall analysis uses Iraq as the main focus and draws the data
from official sources and interviews because the availability of reliable
data has made analysis of the invasion and occupation of Iraq uniquely
worthwhile. But, while access to this data is extremely useful, its
abundance and opaqueness (especially the GAO and SIGIR reports)
necessitates a framework to make sense of it.
A Framework for Analysis
It became obvious to me that understanding the legal basis for PSCs
combined with the many drivers to contract out, would result in an
industry that desires to continue, to make money and employ people. It
is not just a passing phenomenon, therefore, which will shrink or even
disappear after the US leaves Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to make
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of PSCs.26
26Nicholas Dew and Bryan Hudgens, The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey,
20 Feb. 2008, 21–2, 5www.acquisitionresearch.org4.
27I interviewed auditors and other experts at SIGIR on 26 February 2009, who told me
that until six months previously there had been very little credible data available.



























sense of this continuing phenomenon, utilizing the increasingly available
US government documents, this author employs a framework he deve-
loped for the analysis of civil-military relations. It is relevant here in
that, like uniformed military personnel, the PSC employees also carry
weapons. The framework consists of three dimensions: efficiency, con-
trol, and effectiveness.28 For the purposes of this framework, efficiency
is mainly the ability to monitor what the PSCs are doing and the funds
they are doing it with. Control is the capability of the US government,
which provides funds to the PSCs via contracts, to in fact direct them; to
control them. Effectiveness is the ability of the PSCs, as a whole, to
achieve the goals of the US government in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
overall results of the analysis using the data from all of the government
reports, and interviews, are displayed in Table 2 below.
Control and Effectiveness of PSCs
Table 2 indicates that an extensive system of oversight applies to PSCs.
This is the case as the US Congress, similar to the academics cited
above, has focused specifically on them and directed CRS, GAO, CBO,
SIGIR, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruc-
tion (SIGAR) to follow the money and the activities of the PSCs. The
framework directs our attention to control and effectiveness, and,
relying on the US government documents, and interviews, suggests
there are major problems in the two dimensions of control and
effectiveness.
As private firms, the PSCs do not fall under any of the institutional
mechanisms that control the uniformed forces. In the case of the
uniformed armed forces there are extensive institutional mechanisms,
beginning with the civilian-led Department of Defense and the three
military services Army, Air Force, and Navy, including the Marines).
The processes controlling these forces include detailed guidance in
budgets, policy orientation, and in the content of professional military
education (PME). With regard to the PMCs, there is simply nothing
similar. This situation was not foreordained. If the PSCs had been
found to be fulfilling functions that are ‘inherently governmental’ they
would either have had to give up these functions or come under a new
set of controls. Due to extensive lobbying by ‘the industry’ in 2009 and
2010 the continuing definition of ‘inherently governmental’ remains
vague, and the PSCs can continue to make a profit doing what they
28Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, ‘Towards a New
Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’, Democratization
15/5 (2008), 909–29.



























were doing previously.29 Another possible control mechanism could be
the legal system. So far, however, the PSCs and their employees are
largely free of legal constraints. This applies to the international level,
to the national level in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and to the legal
system in the US.30 While there is a large amount of statute that could
apply to the PSCs in the US, my conclusion, which is based upon a
survey of applicable laws, and interviews at DoD, with ‘industry
lawyers,’ and their lobbyists, there is minimal legal basis to control the
PSCs and their employees. This need not be the case, but the
complications arising from the strict rules regarding evidence in US
courts and the ability of the contractors to hire the best lawyers that
money can buy result in this de facto situation.31
Table 2 indicates that effectiveness is also limited for the PSCs. This
is due to two main factors. First, there is no service doctrine on
supervising contractors. There is doctrine at the level of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. But, under Title 10, US Code, recruiting, training, and
equipping is the responsibility of the three military services, and this
also would include dealing with the coordination and management of
contractors on the battlefield.32 The commanders, therefore, and those
29A good summary of the current state of definition regarding the meaning of
inherently governmental is L. Elaine Halchin et al., ‘Inherently Governmental
Functions and Other Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government
Employees: The Obama Administration’s Proposed Policy Letter’, CRS Report for
Congress, 1 Oct. 2010.
30For an excellent survey of relevant laws, which concludes in its last sentence that ‘. . .
Congress may be called on to review and amend the existing statutory framework’. See
Jennifer K. Elsea, ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues’,
CRS Report for Congress, 7 Jan. 2010, 30.
31My conclusion is consistent with Renee De Nevers, a respected scholar who suggests
self-regulation in lieu of the legal regulation. She states, ‘Regulations governing PSCS
thus exist at the international and state level, but their scope is incomplete. The fact
that the United States, whose regulations governing PSCs are the most comprehensive,
has had trouble determining PSC accountability, points to the need for a more effective
regulatory framework at both levels. This also suggests that alternative regulatory
mechanisms such as self-regulation deserve further exploration.’ See Renee De Nevers,
‘(Self) Regulating War? Voluntary Regulation and the Private Security Industry’,
Security Studies 18/3 (2009), 491–2. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, De Nevers
finds that ‘it would be a mistake to trust to self-regulation alone. As it is currently
configured, this industry does not lend itself to obligatory self-regulation.’ De Nevers,
‘(Self) Regulating War?’, 516.
32See ‘Operational Contract Support,’ Joint Publication 4-10, Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 17 Oct. 2008. It should be noted that a more positive view of JP 4-10 is put
forth in Al Borzoo et al., ‘Joint Acquisition Command Doctrine – A Success Story’,
Defense Acquisition Review Journal 16/3 (Oct. 2009) 268–83.



























below them are not trained, or rewarded for that matter, for how well,
or poorly, they deal with contractors, including private security
contractors. Second, there are major personnel issues in that the
contracting officers, those who award the contracts, are virtually all
civilians and are located in the continental US (CONUS) and not in Iraq
or Afghanistan. And, the military personnel in the field, the contracting
officer representatives (CORs) are generally poorly trained, over-
committed, and lacking in numbers.33 The result is a generally
relatively low level of supervision and minimal integration of the PSCs
into strategy and tactics on the battlefield.
The framework offered above helps us identify the major obstacles to
control and effectiveness. With regard to control, both the definition of
inherently governmental functions and the legal basis are determined by
politics. Both could be tightened, should there be sufficient political
will. The same could be said for service doctrine, as the civilian























33All observers, both those I have read and others I have interviewed, are critical of
the role of the CORs in overseeing the execution of the contracts. The Gansler
Commission states the following: ‘Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs), who
are an essential part of contract management, are at best a ‘pick-up game’ in-theater.
CORs represent the ‘last tactical mile’ of expeditionary contracting. However, CORs
are assigned as contract managers/administrators as an ‘extra duty’, requiring no
experience. A COR is often a young Soldier who does not have any experience as a
COR. . . . Although being a COR would ideally be a career-enhancing duty, the
COR assignment is often used to send a young Soldier to the other side of the base
when a commander does not want to have to deal with the person. Additionally,
little, if any, training is provided. To further compound matters, generally all COR
training is geared for a low-operations, low risk tempo, so it is barely adequate.
Despite this, there are still too few CORs. Moreover, COR turnover is high,
frequently leaving many gaps in contract coverage.’ Report of the Commission on
Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler
Commission), 31 Oct. 2007, 3, 5www.army.mil/docs/gansler_commission_report_
final_071031.pdf.4, 43.



























leadership of the three services could insist on the development of
doctrine whereby the uniformed military would include as part of their
responsibility the supervision of private contractors. This leaves the
issue of the awarding of contracts and oversight of its completion.
Before analyzing the possibility of reform in this area, we first need to
recognize the centrality of the contract to the phenomenon we are
studying.
The Centrality of the Contract
The Gansler Commission (named for its chairman, former Under-
secretary of Defense Jacques Gansler), which studied US Army arms
acquisition and program management practices in Kuwait, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, for example, has forcefully made this point:
Contracting is the nexus between our warfighters’ requirements
and the contractors that fulfill those requirements – whether for
food service, interpreters, communications operations, equipment
repair, new or modified equipment, or other supplies and services
indispensable to warfighting operations. In support of critical
military operations contractor personnel must provide timely
services and equipment to the warfighter.34
The challenge is, however, that the field of government acquisitions is
arcane. Very few US government employees understand what is
involved, and virtually nobody outside the field. One has to master
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), in several volumes, be
familiar with extremely complicated processes, and prove it to be
awarded the certificates to be able to award and monitor contracts.35
And, the acquisition process for services, which is what the PSCs
provide, is much more complicated than contracting for things.36
Overall, in the area of acquisitions, the Pentagon is severely
handicapped at managing contracts. An expert in acquisitions,
Dr Rene Rendon demonstrates that the crucial elements for effective
34Gansler Commission Report, 3.
35The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) lists some of the extensive guidance
regarding contracting officers (CO). See FAR, 1.603-1-4.
36For an introduction to what can only be suggested here see Rene G. Rendon and
Keith F. Snider, Management of Defense Acquisition Projects (Reston, VA: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc 2008). And, for a startling visual image
of what has to be managed in the acquisition process see 5https://akss.dau.mil/ifc4
or 5http://bookstore.gpo.gov4 (for version 5.3.4 of the DAU Acquisition System
chart).



























oversight are lacking in terms of both the required numbers of
personnel and their core competencies, given the complexities of service
contracts. The task of formulating the requirements is especially
complicated and difficult, and, in Rendon’s opinion, the acquisition
workforce available does not have the skill set and experience to meet
the demands of the work.37 On this point, interviewees, contractors,
lobbyists, auditors, and staffers were virtually unanimous. The Defense
Science Board report cited above recommends: ‘Establish separate
policies and processes to improve management and oversight of
contingency contracting. Recommended actions in this area include
creating a single playbook for all relevant information needed at
the start of a contingency operation and including the acquisition
and participation of services contractors in realistic exercises and
training.’38
This is an institutional issue that would be very difficult to remedy,
even with political will. The scope of the problem is daunting. The
Gansler Commission Report directly addresses the fact that the
contract management workforce has not increased despite a sevenfold
increase in the workload:
In 1990, the Army had approximately 10,000 people in
contracting. This was reduced to approximately 5,500, where it
has remained relatively constant since 1996 . . . . yet both the
number of contract actions (workload) and the dollar value of
procurements (an indicator of complexity) have dramatically
increased in the past decade while the contracting workforce has
remained constant. The dollar value of Army contracts has
increased 331 percent from $23.3 billion in 1992 to $100.6 billion
in 2006, while the number of Army contract actions increased 654
percent from approximately 52,900 to 398,700 over the same
period.39
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of contract managers are
civilians; out of a total of 5,800, there are only 279 military personnel
37Management of Defense Acquisition Projects, 267–80. As stated on page 270, there is
no acquisition workforce in the service area. The author of this article has some
awareness of what is involved in contracting as he has drawn extensively on the faculty
and students, who are contracting officers, at the Graduate School of Business and
Public Policy at the US Naval Postgraduate School.
38Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services
Contracting, Washington DC, March 2011, iv.
39Gansler Commission Report, 30



























doing this job.40 This is an extremely important point, as military
personnel can be deployed much more easily than can civilians, and the
report goes into some detail on why it is difficult to deploy civilians.
This means that the contract managers are not located in Iraq or
Afghanistan, where the contract work is being done, but rather in the
United States.
Combining the four major challenges identified by the use of the
framework in both control and effectiveness, we can better assess the
potential for reform in private security contracting. Again, we should
remember that the majority of the scholarly literature includes
recommendations on resolving problems with contracting out security.
Is it Possible for the US Government to Implement Reforms?
Congress has placed on the Executive Branch, and fundamentally the
Pentagon, extensive requirements to deal with mainly the problem of
effectiveness. For example, Section 862 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 gives extensive guidance to
the executive branch on the topic of ‘contractors performing private
security functions in areas of combat operations.’ This author had two
meetings, in mid-June and mid-September 2009, with lead personnel in
the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary (Logistics &
Materiel Readiness/Program Support), the main office in the Pentagon
responsible for acting on the guidance. The chief there, the ADUSD, did
a very thorough job of reviewing the issues with contracting that have
resulted in poor control and effectiveness.41 There is no doubt that he,
and his office, understands what is involved. The office had been
created on the recommendation of the GAO in October 2006 in order
to assign responsibility in one office in the Pentagon to implement
congressional guidance regarding the PSCs.42
At these meetings, the staff highlighted two areas of progress toward
remedying what is defined here as problems of effectiveness. First is
a July 2009 Department of Defense Instruction that provides guidance
to DoD and DoS on the use of PSCs in contingency operations.43
40Gansler Commission Report, 35, Table 9.
41Author interview with Assistant Deputy Under Secretary (Logistics & Materiel
Readiness/Program Support), Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington DC, 17
June 2009. In addition, my research assistant had meetings there on 24 August 2011,
and I had further e-mail exchanges with the office on 12 February 2011.
42The position, and the responsibilities that go with it, are found in Department of
Defense Directive Number 3020.49, 24 March 2009.
43‘Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations’,
Department of Defense Instruction No. 3020.50, 22 July 2009.



























Second is a Rule that ‘. . . establishes policy, assigns responsibilities and
provides procedures for the regulation of the selection, accountability,
training, equipping, and conduct of personnel performing private
security functions under a covered contract during contingency
operations’.44
These initiatives go toward improving coordination of the PSCs with
military planning and operations in the field. They are a small step
toward fixing some of the most serious problems military commanders
face if they attempt to integrate PSCs into their planning. There is,
however, little doctrine to integrate the PSCs into combat operations.
The current guidance, issued by the Joint Staff, remains sketchy. It is
supposed to be replaced by a Department of Defense Instruction, which
was still in the staffing process in March 2011. Among other
requirements, this document calls for the development of contractor
oversight plans and adequate military personnel to oversee the
contracts. The ADUSD office has joint responsibility with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to develop training for the armed forces on the use of
PSCs, but by the end of 2010, this training had not even begun
(although a contractor had prepared the training modules). The
Pentagon is implementing to some degree the guidance it has received
from Congress included in the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY 2008. There are organizations whose purpose is to manage defense
contracting, including the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq and the
Defense Contract Audit Agency, and there are efforts to build the
contractors into the military capability. As highlighted in the Gansler
Report, and reiterated in several interviews, however, the military is
resistant to full recognition and thus incorporation of contractors into a
contingency environment, and the personnel requirements for over-
seeing the implementation of contracts in this environment remain
unmet. And, to reiterate a key point since it is not well understood by
those outside the military, is the fact that Title 10 of the United States
Code gives the armed services the authority to organize, train, supply,
equip, and maintain their particular Armed Service. Thus, while the
Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant
commanders can issue directives, cajole, even threaten in their efforts to
bring the services in line with congressional direction, it is up to the
services to do what is necessary to somehow incorporate contractors
within their doctrine and operations.
As noted above, contractors were included in the Quadrennial
Defense Review of 6 February 2006 as a fourth ‘element’ of the Total
44‘The Interim Final Rule on Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in
Contingency Operations’, Federal Register, Vol. 74/136 (17 July 2009).



























Force. The February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also includes
the contractors, and now in cautious terms:
The services provided by contractors will continue to be valued as
part of a balanced approach that properly considers both mission
requirements and overall return. In keeping with the
Administration’s goal of reducing the government’s dependence
on contractors, the Department introduced its in-sourcing
initiative in the FY 2010 budget. Over the next five years, the
Department will reduce the number of support service contractors
to their pre-2001 level of 26 percent of the workforce (from the
current level of 39 percent) and replace them, if needed, with full-
time government employees.45
And, in the Administration’s 2011 budget submission, the federal
acquisition workforce would grow significantly, some 5 per cent, and also
proposes investments in training, certification management, and technol-
ogy for the contracting staff.46 However, and in line with the approach to
the politics of control discussed above regarding the definition of inherently
governmental functions, and combined with the legal dimension, these
efforts have been stymied by legal cases brought by the industry.47
Focusing now on the key element linking private security contractors
to the US government, which is the contract, and mainly on who awards
and oversees it, this author is pessimistic about the potential for reform.
While it may seem banal to say, money does matter, and there is a pay
disparity between federal civil service pay and the average of wages/
salaries in the private sector. According to a CRS Report, average wages
among all workers in the economy rose by 632 per cent between 1969
and 2010; salaries for federal employees have increased by 428 per cent
during the same period.48 This gap, which signifies a lack of incentive to
enter the federal service, was a continuing theme in my interviews with
contracting officers. Some of those interviewed pointed out that the
disparity between federal and private sector pay has three consequences:
First, a lot of very good people do not enter federal service since they
can do much better financially in the private sector; Second, those that
45See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, Feb. 2010, 55–6,
5www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200700.pdf4.
46For the budget submission see, 5www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?re-
leaseid¼132814.
47See Kate M. Manuel and Jack Maskell, ‘Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal
Contractors: An Overview of the Legal Issues’, CRS Report for Congress, 8 June 2011.
48Patrick Purcell, ‘Federal Employees: Pay and Pension Increases Since 1969’, CRS
Report for Congress, 20 Jan. 2010.



























do become federal employees often leave after only a few years service;
and, Third, those that leave frequently use the experience gained in the
government to ‘outsmart’ the government when they deal with it.
My research found evidence of all three consequences. In his
compelling analysis of the multiple causes for the US government’s
inability faithfully to execute the laws, Paul Light highlights, among
other factors, ‘. . . the clear incentives that make a contract or grant job
more attractive than a civil service position’.49 Basically, civilian
acquisition specialists are an endangered species. They are the ones who
make the contracts work, or not, and if they leave government service
for better paying jobs in the private ‘industry’ the reform efforts,
as logical and necessary as they may be, will go nowhere. From my
interviews with contracting officers, and extensive contact with
contractors, it is hard for me to imagine anyone who has the option
to leave and work for a PSC would remain in the US government
workforce where the pay does not compare to working for private
industry and where the regulations are petty, inconsistent, and
extremely irritating.
Conclusion
The topic covered in this article, the PSC, is an important and
continuing phenomenon. There are many serious efforts to understand
it and its implications. There are, however, impediments to under-
standing and even more impediments to implementation of reform
initiatives. The main ones have been reviewed here. In seeking to
provide material for a better understanding of the phenomenon this
article has drawn on US government documents and interviews. This
data has been organized in line with a framework developed for the
analysis of civil-military relations, since the PSCs have taken on tasks
previously carried out by uniformed personnel. In using this data and
the framework, serious problems have been identified with both control
and effectiveness. With political will, three of the four problems
identified – the meaning of inherently governmental, the legal basis for
control, and service doctrine – could be dealt with. The last, however,
the awarding and oversight of contracts, is dependent on stable and
capable personnel. Unfortunately, government service is not attractive
in comparison to the offers from the industry, and does not promise to
become so in the foreseeable future.
49Paul C. Light, A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and
How to Reverse it (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2008), 206.




























Thomas C. Bruneau is Distinguished Professor of National Security
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He
has published extensively on civil-military relations, and his mono-
graph on the topic of private security contractors, Patriots for Profit:
Contractors and the Military in US National Security, was published by
Stanford University Press in 2011.
Bibliography
Alexandra, Andrew, and Deane-Peter Baker and Marina Caparini (eds), Private Military and
Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil–Military Relations (New York: Routledge
2008).
Avant, Deborah D., Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994).
Avant, Deborah D., The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (New York:
Cambridge UP 2005).
Avant, Deborah D. and Lee Sigelman, ‘Private Security and Democracy: Lessons from the US in
Iraq’, Security Studies 19/2 (April–June 2010), 230–65.
Bensahel, Nora. ‘Mission Not Accomplished: What Went Wrong with Iraqi Reconstruction’, The
Journal of Strategic Studies 29/3 (June 2006), 453–73.
Bensahel, Nora, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas
Sullivan and Andrew Rathmel, After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center 2008).
Borzoo, Al, Constance S. Short, Ken Brockway and Col. Stan L. VanderWerf, USAF, ‘Joint
Acquisition Command Doctrine – A Success Story’, Defense Acquisition Review Journal 16/3
(Oct. 2009) 268–83.
Brooks, Risa A., Shaping Strategy: The Civil–Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton
UP 2008).
Brooks, Risa A. and Elizabeth A. Stanley (eds), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military
Effectiveness (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2007).
Bruneau, Thomas C., Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in US National Security
(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2011).
Bruneau, Thomas C. and Scott D. Tollefson (eds), Who Guards the Guardians and How:
Democratic Civil-Military Relations (Austin: University of Texas Press 2006).
Bruneau, Thomas C. and Florina Cristiana (Cris) Matei, ‘Towards a New Conceptualization
of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations’, Democratization 15/5 (Dec. 2008), 909–
29.
Bryden, Alan, and Marina Caparini (eds), Private Actors and Security Governance (Berlin: Lit
Verlag 2006).
Cheadle, Samuel P., ‘Private Military Contractor Liability Under the Worldwide Personal
Protective Services II Contract’, Public Contract Law Journal 38/3 (Spring 2009).
Chesterman, Simon and Chia Lehnardt (eds), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and
Regulation of Private Military Companies (New York: OUP 2007).
Chesterman, Simon and Angelina Fisher (eds), Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of
Public Services and Its Limits (New York: OUP 2009).
Collins, Joseph J., ‘Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath’, Occasional
Paper, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2008.



























Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (the
Gansler Commission), ‘Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting’ Report of
the Commission. Washington DC: Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Manage-
ment in Expeditionary Operations (the Gansler Commission), 31 Oct. 2007.
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘At What Cost? Contingency
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Interim Report’, Washington DC: Commission on
Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 10 June 2009.
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, ‘At What Risk? Correcting Over-
reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations’, Second Interim Report to Congress,
Washington DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, 24 Feb.
2011.
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Contractors’ Support of US Operations in Iraq (Washington
DC: CBO Aug. 2008).
Cullen, Patrick and Peter Ezra Weinberger, POI Report: Reframing the Defense Outsourcing
Debate: Merging Government Oversight with Industry Partnership (Washington DC: Peace
Operations Institute 2007).
De Nevers, Renee, ‘(Self) Regulating War? Voluntary Regulation and the Private Security
Industry’, Security Studies 18/3 (2009), 491–516.
Dew, Nicholas and Bryan Hudgens, ‘The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey’, Acquisition
Research Program, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. Monterey, CA: US Naval
Postgraduate School, 20 Feb. 2008, 5www.acquisitionsresearch.org4.
Donahue, John D., The Privatization Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (New York: Basic
Books 1989).
Dunigan, Molly, Victory for Hire: Private Security Contractors’ Impact on Military Effectiveness
(Stanford: Stanford UP 2011).
Edmunds, Timothy, ‘What Are Armed Forces For? The Changing Nature of Military Roles in
Europe’, International Affairs 82/6 (Nov. 2006), 1059–75.
Elsea, Jennifer K., ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues’, CRS Report
for Congress (R 40991), 7 Jan. 2010.
Elsea, Jennifer K., Moshe Schwartz and Kennon H. Nakamura, ‘Private Security Contractors in
Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’, CRS Report for Congress (RL 32419),
Washington DC, updated 29 Sept. 2008.
Fainaru, Steve, Big Boy Rules: America’s Mercenaries Fighting in Iraq (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo
Press 2008).
Feaver, Peter D., Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard UP 2003).
Grasso, Valerie Bailey. ‘Defense Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan: Issues and Options for
Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (RL 33834), 19 Feb. 2009.
Haass, Richard N., War of Necessity War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars (New York:
Simon & Schuster 2009).
Halchin L. Elaine, ‘Circular A-76 Revision 2003: Selected Issues’, CRS Report for Congress
(RL 32017), Washington DC, updated 7 Jan. 2005.
Halchin L. Elaine, Kate M. Manuel, Shawn Reese and Moshe Schwartz, ‘Inherently Governmental
Functions and Other Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees: The
Obama Administration’s Proposed Policy Letter’, CRS Report for Congress (R 41209)
Washington DC, 1 Oct. 2010.
Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, ‘Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’,
Political Studies 44 (1996), 936–57.
Hammes, T.X., ‘Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic
Impact’, Joint Forces Quarterly 60 (2011), 27–37.
Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press 1981 [Originally published in 1957]).



























Kaiser, Frederick M., ‘ GAO: Government Accountability Office and General Accounting Office’,
CRS Report for Congress (RL 30349), Washington, DC, updated 22 June 2007.
Kinsey, Christopher, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military
Companies (London/New York: Routledge 2006).
Kosar, Kevin R., ‘Privatization and the Federal Government’, CRS Report for Congress
‘Introduction’ (RL 33777) Washington DC, 26 Dec. 2008.
Leander, Anna, Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of
Force (Rome: Rubbettino Editore 2006).
Lee, Tara, ‘Redefining Inherently Governmental: The Push to Redefine the Function and Its
Consequences’, Journal of International Peace Operations 4/1 (July–Aug. 2008).
Light, Paul C., The True Size of Government (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 1999).
Light, Paul C., A Government Ill Executed: The Decline of the Federal Service and How to
Reverse it (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 2008).
Locher, James R. III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon
(College Station: Texas A&M UP 2004).
Luckey, John R., ‘OMB Circular A-76: Explanation and Discussion of the Recently Revised
Federal Outsourcing Policy’, CRS Report for Congress (RS 21489). Washington DC, updated
10 Sept. 2003
Luckey, John R., Valerie Bailey Grasso, and Kate M. Manuel, ‘Inherently Governmental Functions
and Department of Defense Operations: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress’, CRS
Report for Congress (R40641). Washington DC, 14 Sept. 2009.
Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince, translated and edited by Robert M. Adams (New York: Norton
1977 [Originally written in 1513]).
McCoy, Katherine E, ‘Beyond Civil–Military Relations: Reflections on Civilian Control of a
Private, Multinational Workforce’, Armed Forces & Society 36/4 (2010), 671–94.
Manuel, Kate M. and Jack Maskell, ‘Insourcing Functions Performed by Federal Contactors: An
Overview of the Legal Issues’, CRS Report for Congress (R41810). Washington DC, 8 June.
2011.
Mendel, Robert, The Privatization of Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002).
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the
Defense Science Board Task Force on Improvements to Services Contracting, Washington DC
March 2011.
Pelton, Robert Young, Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror (New York: Three
Rivers Press 2006).
Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), ‘Forging a New Shield: Executive Summary’.
Washington DC: PNSR, Nov. 2008.
Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), ‘Turning Ideas into Action: A Progress Report’.
Washington DC: PNSR, 30 Sept. 2009.
Purcell, Patrick, ‘Federal Employees: Pay and Pension Increases Since 1969’, CRS Report for
Congress, 20 Jan. 2010.
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6 Feb. 2006.
Quadrennial Defense Review, Feb. 2010, Department of Defense, Washington DC.
RAND Corporation (Sarah K. Cotton, Ulrich Petersohn, Molly Dunigan, Q. Burkhart, Megan
Zander-Cougno, Edward O’Connell and Michael Webber), Hired Guns. Views About Armed
Contractors in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2010).
Rendon, Rene G. and Keith F. Snider (eds), Management of Defense Acquisition Projects
(Palmdale, CA: Lockheed Martin Corporation for the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics 2008).
Ricks, Thomas, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Press
2006).
Ricks, Thomas, The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in
Iraq, 2006–2008 (New York: Penguin Press 2009).



























Scahill, Jeremy, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New York:
Nation Books 2007).
Schwartz, Moshe, ‘Training the Military to Manage Contractors during Expeditionary
Operations: Overview and Options for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (R40057), 17
Dec. 2008.
Serra, Narcı´s, La transicio´n militar: Reflexiones en torno a la reforma democra´tica de las fuerzas
armadas (Barcelona: Debate 2008).
Serra, Narcı´s, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, translated by
Peter Bush (Cambridge: CUP 2010).
Shearer, David, Private Armies and Military Intervention (New York: OUP 1998).
Sheehy, Benedict, Jackson Maogoto and Virginia Newell, Legal Control of the Private Military
Corporation (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2009).
Singer, P.W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell UP 2003).
Singer, P.W., ‘Can’t Win with ‘em, Can’t Go to War without ‘em: Private Military Contractors
and Counterinsurgency’, Policy Paper Number 4. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, Sept.
2007.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Agencies Need Improved Financial
Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors’, Washington DC: SIGIR 30 Oct. 2008.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Enabling Legislation as Amended’,
Washington DC: SIGIR 2009.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruc-
tion Experience (Washington DC: SIGIR 2009).
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Need to Enhance Oversight of
Theater-Wide Internal Security Services Contracts’, Washington, DC: SIGIR 24 April 2009.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Comprehensive Plan for Audits of
Private Security Contractors to Meet the Requirements of Section 842 of Public Law 110-181’,
updated 8 May 2009.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Quarterly Report and Semiannual
Report to the United States Congress’, 30 July 2009.
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), ‘Long-Standing Weaknesses in
Department of State’s Oversight of DynCorp Contract for Support of the Iraqi Police Training
Program’, 25 Jan. 2010.
Stanger, Allison, One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future
of Foreign Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 2009).
Stephenson, James, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction
(Washington DC: Potomac Books 2007).
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Acquisition Workforce: Department of Defense’s
Plans to Address Workforce Size and Structure Challenges’, (GAO-02-630), Washington DC,
April 2002.
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘High-Risk Series: An Update. Strategic Human
Capital Management’, GAO Report to Congress (GAO-09-271), Washington DC, Jan. 2009.
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Department of Defense. Additional Actions and
Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DoD’s Acquisition Workforce’, GAO
Report to Congressional Requesters (GAO-09-342), Washington DC, March 2009.
US Government Accountability Office (GAO), ‘Contingency Contracting: DoD, State, and USAID
Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan’, (GAO-10-1), Oct. 2009
Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States, ‘Defense Acquisitions: DoD’s
Increased Reliance on Service Contactors Exacerbates Long-Standing Challenges.’ Statement
of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States (GAO-08-621T). 3 Jan.
2008.



























Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States, ‘DoD Needs to Reexamine its
Extensive Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight’,
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, US House of
Representatives, 110th Congress, 2nd session, 11 March 2008.
Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Gunther Roth
and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press 1978).
Wedel, R. Janine, Shadow Elite: How The World’s New Power Brokers Undermine Democracy,
Government, and the Free Market (New York: Basic Books 2009).
Zegart, Amy, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford
UP 1999).
28 Thomas C. Bruneau
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
av
al 
Po
stg
rad
ute
 Sc
ho
ol]
 at
 11
:35
 21
 M
ay
 20
12
 
